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LAW AND SOCIETIES
By PETER FITZPATRICK*

Professor Fitzpatrickoffers an examination of bourgeoislegality as the concrete
embodiment of modern law. Citing examples from the prison system and the
workplace, he finds that modern law exists in certain relations of opposition and
support with other socialforms. From these relations, certain modes of convergence and separationbetween law and other social forms are identified and explored. To test the utility of this analysis, Fitzpatrick provides an extended
applicationto traditionalscholarship about the nature of law and its relation to
society. The central focus in this enquiry is the idea of integral plurality as a
vehicle by which the abstracted, unitary and universalisticpretensions of the
modern legal system may be exposed.
..and even the sensitive animals tell that we're not very surely at home here in
this encodified world. Perhaps we have still one special tree on the hillside we
pass every day that we notice, we still possess yesterday's street and the devoted
persistence of an old habit which decided it liked us and stayed with us.'

I.

INTRODUCTION

"Law and Societies" is a gentle play on the title of the lecture
series, "Law and Society," held at Osgoode Hall Law School in 198182. In various ways, that series provided the origins for this paper.2 The
title encapsulates the central theme of the paper: that state law is integrally constituted in relation to a plurality of social forms. 3 This is
called the theme of 'integral plurality.' In its development, the theme
exposes the limits of viewing law as "typically public, unified and direct
in its operation." 4 This idea of law creates a distortion; liberation from
it opens up radical possibilities for the study and the politics of law.
In outline, the paper takes the familiar academic field of legal pluCopyright, 1984, P. Fitzpatrick.
* Senior Lecturer in Law and Interdisciplinary Studies at the University of Kent at Canterbury, England. In working on this piece, I deeply appreciated the intellectual companionship of
Rue Bendall and Dave Reason. Noel Machin provided his incomparable translation of Rilke. The
faculty and students at Osgoode Hall Law School provided a most stimulating and a most convivial
setting for introducing the ideas elaborated in this paper.
Rilke, Duino Elegies I, translated by Noel Machin.
O

The paper is mostly a compendium of several presentations at Osgoode during a visit in
January 1982 to deliver a lecture on "Law, Plurality and Historical Materialism" as part of this
series.
3 Here "form" is not used as something devoid of 'content,' but rather as content rendered
determinate.
4 Galanter, "Legality and Its Discontents: A Preliminary Assessment of Current Theories of
Legalization and Delegalization," in Blankenburg, Klausa and Rottleuthner, eds., Alternative
Rechtsformen und Alternativen zum Recht, Jahrbuchfur Rechtssoziologie und Rechistheorie,
Band VI (1980) 20.
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ralism as a point of departure. In sustaining the idea of a persistent
plurality of legal orders, legal pluralism has proved an enduring, if
marginal affront to unitary, state-centred theories of law. Yet its own
relation to the state, and to state law, has been distinctly ambivalent.
Some of its adherents attribute no special pre-eminence to the state
and even see it as subordinate to other social forms. In this view, there
is left an unstructured and promiscuous plurality. Other adherents prematurely reduce or subordinate plurality to some putative totality, usually the state or state law. I want to argue that both these stands are
'right'; they are not opposed, but rather, reflect mutual elements of a
wider process. State law does take identity by deriving support from
other social forms. Thus, it would appear to be one social form among
many, even as a subordinate form. But in the constitution and maintenance of its identity, state law stands in opposition to and in asserted
domination over social forms that support it. There exists a contradictory process of mutual support and opposition. This process is tested
and given more specific elaboration in instances of the relations between state law and other social forms, including the prison and the
capitalist labour relation. Further, the academic utility of the analysis
is found in the light it throws on certain perennial concerns: the gap
between law and social reality; the link between law and consensus; and
stages of legal development.
II. LEGAL PLURALISM
Using legal pluralism as a starting point, I will draw a distinction
between two approaches to it: the diffusive and the centerist. 5 Ehrlich,
the ancestor of the diffusive, remains an apt example. For him, the very
basis of state law was a prior "social law" or "living law" which was
the "inner order of associations." 6 Although the state is one of a plurality of associations, state law is subordinate to "living law." In the event
of a conflict between the two, it would be ineffective. Attempts in this
tradition to integrate state law and other legal orders have similarly
been in denial of the originality of state law. An example is Bohannan's
famed attempt at integration in which state law results from a "double
institutionalization of norms" in which some "customs", operative
within "social institutions" are "reinstitutionalized at another level" as
state law. 7 There is nothing in such a reconciliation that would accord
5 These approaches are treated in more detail in Fitzpatrick, Marxism and Legal Pluralism
(1983), 1 Aust. J. L. & Soc'y 45.
6 Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (1936) at 39-82.
7 Bohannan, "The Differing Realms of Law," in Bohannan, ed., Law and Warfare: Studies
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state law any distinctness and identity, much less accord it the original
efficacy that, on occasion, it manifestly has. As well, that element of
the tradition that would treat all legal orders equally fails to account
for conflict between orders, a conflict that may point towards some
overarching status for state law.
As for the centerist stand, a start should be made with Gierke.
Like Ehrlich, Gierke saw associations as having a life of their own. The
state was one such association. However, with Gierke's organic theory
of society, the state is an association which embraces all other associations and has ultimate authority over them.8 Whilst advancing theories
of pluralism, legal scholars have been prone to make a pre-emptory
ascription of ultimate domination to state law. This is well established
in Griffith's acute and relentless analysis of legal pluralists which underlines the obduracy of "legal centralism" in this scholarship.9 Both
the diffusive and centerist strands encapsulate processes constituting
state law in its relation to other social forms. Accordingly, it is necessary to move on to state law and its relation to a plurality of social
forms. To this extent, the paper ceases to be exclusively about legal
pluralism, but, insofar as social forms are integral to non-state law, the
discussion remains one about legal pluralism, at least for those who
wish to read it as such.
III. INTEGRAL PLURALITY AND STATE LAW
Social forms are constituted in contradictory relations of support
and opposition with a plurality of other social forms. 10 I tentatively
suggest that the more social forms stand in a relation of integral support, the sharper is the opposition between them: "the more alike, the
more dissimilar.""' To establish the first proposition, I will take one
idea of law, that of bourgeois legality or the rule of law, and show that
in the Anthropology of Conflict (1967) 43 at 47-48.
8 See Hallis, CorporatePersonality:A Study in Jurisprudence (1930) at 140-65.
9 Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?,(paperpresented at the Annual Meeting of the Law

and Society Association, Amherst, June 12-14, 1981). Griffiths' valuable account extends also to
the diffusive strand in legal pluralism.
10 This, and the method of analysis that follows, could be seen as a crude derivation from

Hegel's ideas of contradiction and the dialectic but one which differs in several basic ways from
Hegel: see Taylor, Hegel (1975) at 104-106, 227-31 and 238. Of course, the germ of these ideas is
not exactly unusual: cf.McDonald, The Legal Sociology of Georges Gurvitch (1979), 6 Brit. J. L.
& Soc'y 24 at 30-31.
"I One

of "a motley collection of maxims to disguise our epistemological nakedness" from

Reason, Generalization from the Single Case: Some Foundational Considerations, (paper

presented at the Conference on .The Formal Analysis of Qualitative Data, University of Surrey,
Guildford, Apr., 1983) at 32.
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certain other social forms are conditions of its existence. The prison
and the capitalist labour relation will be used as examples. The next
step involves showing that the relations between bourgeois legality and
these other social forms are contradictory. Bourgeois legality depends
on social forms that tend to undermine it. The case of the dependency
of other social forms on law is considered only incidentally. In the next
section, the analysis becomes more concrete in its consideration of the
operative modes taken by the contradictory relations of opposition and
support. The present analysis is only a beginning, an open and preliminary enquiry the coverage and bounds of which are not comprehensive.
It celebrates the particular, and pries open holistic, unitary conceptions
of law. As such, this exercise is not at one with mainstream pluralism
for it does not seek to deny overarching and integrating structures of
domination.12
To ground the analysis, I will begin by looking briefly at bourgeois
legality and the prison before taking the wage labour relation as my
main example. There are several, more or less subtle ways in which
bourgeois legality depends on the prison but, in the broad approach
being used here, it is sufficient to point to the prison, in particular, as
the ultimate enforcer of law. Moreover, it is an exemplar of a pervasive, disciplinary power that typifies modern society and that effects
particularist coercions which leave bourgeois legality 'free' to assume
its aspects of equality and universality.3 The relation of bourgeois legality to the prison is a contradictory one. It is increasingly evident that
prisons in 'liberal democracies' necessarily operate on the basis of arbitrary, authoritarian and Draconic power and that their operation would
be impossible if the rule of law extended to relations within the
prison.1 4 Conversely, if bourgeois legality did so extend, it would lose
identity as bourgeois legality. The prison is part of the necessary "dark
side" of bourgeois legality. 5 Yet it is of the essence of bourgeois legality that the rule of law be universal. Consequently, bourgeois legality is
asserted through the legal supervision by law of relations in the prison.
This supervision is, however, always limited and marginal in its operation. It serves to set boundaries beyond which law will not proceed.
When the judiciary reach these bounds, its inability to proceed further
is justified on such evasive, but indicative grounds as the public interest
22 Cf Fitzpatrick, "Law, Plurality and Underdevelopment," in Sugarman, ed., Legality, Ideology and the State (1983) 159.
1S For a fuller treatment see Fitzpatrick, supra note 5.
14 See, e.g., Abbott, In the Belly of the Beast: Letters from Prison (1972) and Zdenkowski

and Brown, The Prison Struggle: Changing Australia's Penal System (1982).
15 Foucault, Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison (1979) at 222.
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and the smooth running of the prison regime."8
To approach, in good company, the relation between bourgeois legality and the labour relation,
Marx reveals that the the fundamental condition of existence of the legal form is
rooted in the very economic organization of society. In other words, the existence
of the legal form is contingent upon the integration of the different products of
labour according to the principle of economic exchange. In so doing, he exposes
17
the deep interconnection between the legal form and the commodity form.

Bourgeois legality derives its constituent elements of freedom and
equality from commodity exchange. Where labour power cannot be obtained 'freely' through its exchange as a commodity, direct compulsions
in the field of production become necessary. However, this is incompatible with bourgeois legality. Commodity exchange can only be the realization of what is produced and production under capitalism is based
on coercion and inequality. The freedom and equality imported by
commodity exchange has to be kept separate from immediate relations
of production. Bourgeois legality depends on the separation. The separation is achieved in an enthrallingly neat manner. Immediate relations
of production, characterized by coercion and inequality, are necessarily
entered into via the elements of freedom and equality imparted by
commodity exchange. The element of compulsion, the necessity to labour for a wage, is general; it is not confined to or even specific to any
particular employment relation.
Immediate relations of production come into being through the
'voluntary' and 'personal' commitment of the worker as an individual
legal subject entering into a contract of employment. Bourgeois legality
creates what is opposed to it, but it blunts the contradiction by investing its creation with its own aura. Life within the workplace becomes a
matter of 'private' and 'economic' relations; outside is a matter of 'public' and 'political' relations. But immediate relations of production are
also political relations which are ultimately based on compulsion. They
are political relations of control over the worker and over production of
hierarchic subordination and inequality. 18 They have to be kept apart
from the contrary rationalities of bourgeois legality. If relations of
equality and freedom pervaded the workplace or if there were a reverse
process, there would be a very different type of law to that characterized by bourgeois legality. This is revealed in the necessary respect
16 See, e.g., Becker v. Home Office, [1972] 2 Q.B. 407 and Payne v. Lord Harris of Greenwich, [1981] 2 All E.R. 842.
17 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism A General Theory (1978) at 63.
19 See Wood, The Separatlonof the Economic and the Politicalin Capitalism(1981), 127
New Left Rev. 66.
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which bourgeois legality shows for the integrity of the regime of the
work-place in the severely limited effect of anti-discrimination law on
the labour relation. Such legislation cannot displace the opposing practical rationalities of the immediate relations of production.19
IV.

MODES OF RELATION

To make the analysis more concrete and more complex, I will present a more historically specific aspect of the wage labour relation.
There has been a remarkable increase in the formalization of "workplace discipline" in British factories in the last twenty years.2 0 Stuart
Henry charts "a dramatic change. . . in the form of disciplinary technology during the period in question towards the formalization of rules
and procedures. 21 These are rules and procedures internal to the factory. During the same period, there was a large increase in external
state regulation of the labour relation. A guiding code of practice was
promulgated, legislation on "employment protection" was enacted (providing, for example, a remedy against "unfair dismissal") and "industrial tribunals" were established to deal with a range of employment
disputes.
The main thrust of these developments is the link between internal
and external changes. Henry finds that "the evidence. . . supports the
view that formalization takes place as a result of government and legislative pressure." 22 The how of it is fascinating. The state's code of
practice provides recommended rules and procedures only. However,
internal disciplinary proceedings tend to follow the code since, as one
manager put it, "going about these things in a different way might lead
towards an Industrial Tribunal. '2 3 Such an outcome does not seem a
matter of direct justiciability, but a breach of the code could be damaging evidence in a justiciable claim, such as in one for unfair dismissal. Yet the state's involvement does not seem to constrain management
greatly. As the same manager put it: "[t]he Code does in fact reflect
the practice of industry . . . there has been a pressure on us to mold
things into the shape of the Code but only minor things. The general

19 Cf., Mayhew, "Stability and Change in Legal Systems," in Barber and Inkeles, eds., Stability and Social Change (1971) 187.
20 Henry, Factory Law: The Changing DisciplinaryTechnology of IndustrialSocial Control
(1982), 10 Int'l. J. Soc. L. 365.
21 Id. at 369.
22 Id.
23

Id. at 370.
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philosophy is identical to the Code." 24 Indeed, Henry considers that
formalization has operated to support management by giving it, in the
face of counter-assertions of power by workers, a 'legitimate' means to
dismiss. 25 To generate such legitimacy internally, it would be necessary
for formalization to be of some, even if mixed, benefit for workers. This
is the case. There are many measures supporting workers and, in a
related development, there has been a growth in the participation of
workers "in rule creation," "in establishing procedures" and "in
administration. 2 8
Henry emphasizes the limits of these changes. Thus, he found that
"what is formalized is largely procedural," and "the due process-like
model typically has representative participation only in its warning,
procedural and appeals stages, and crucially important, not in its rule
making or sanctioning stages." As well, "unions participate far more in
creating procedures than in making rules, and far more in representing
employees, than in deciding their fate."12 7 There is a strong suggestion
that these changes are, in total, a strategy for containing workers and
unions. Not that this is a fixed resolution. Henry finds some "tension"
between the involvement of workers and the potentiality of the situation to "undermine managements' ability to control." 28 "Automatic
employee self-discipline" does, however, restrain the demands put on
participation.29 Overall, it seems there has been no significant change
in the type of behaviour punished nor in the nature of the sanctions
imposed.30 There is continuity in the substantive law of the factory despite procedural changes. As for substantive law, it is indicative to find
the law of the workplace dealing with such matters as "theft of company property . . . violence and assault, fraud . . . [and] damage to
property."31
These and other instances can be used to map out modes of relation between law and other social forms. In fact, this mapping could be
developed into a complex of contradictions. I will do little more than
intimate that conclusion. The mapping is founded on the dichotomy of
convergence and separation between law and other social forms. The
dichotomy is further divided into positive and negative aspects. This
24 Id.

28

Id.
Id. at

27
28

Id. at 370-71, 377.
Id. at 374.

25

Id. at

371-73.

371-73.
See, id. at 375-77.
31 Id. at 375.
29
30
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creates a quadruple division: convergence/positive; convergence/negative; separation/positive; separation/negative.
Integral relations of mutual support between law and another social form tend towards their convergence. It is not such a matter of
distinct influence operating from the outside. Elements of law are elements of other social forms and vice versa. So, with Bohannan's
"double institutionalization of norms," some state law results by absorbing material by custom.32 Custom supports law, but law transforms
the elements of custom that it appropriates into its own image and likeness.3 3 Law in turn supports other social forms, but becomes in the
process part of the other forms. Henry's account of the strategic intervention of law in support of the regime of the workplace showed law
subsuming itself to the alien rationalities of this other form. Non-state
legal orders will often appropriate legal contents and techniques taken
from the state. For instance, Santos provides a case study of how an
urban community in Brazil constructed its own legality in drawing considerably on state law." Supportive interactions are, however, much
more complex, layered, and even dialectical. So, to use Henry's case
study, the state "code" applying to the factory was derived largely
from the practice of the factory, but it modified that practice. This
becomes relevant to claims before the State's industrial tribunals and
their treatment of such claims shapes the practice. And so it goes on.
To take another example, law, in support of the regime of the
workplace, is supporting that which supports it. As we saw in Henry's
account, the workplace deals with much crime on behalf of the state.
More generally, I have considered the dependence of bourgeois legality
on the wage labour relation. Along with the labour relation, I would
suggest that a further example is the most significant for societies of
advanced capitalism.3 5 It is not infrequently said that law is increasingly dependent on and being displaced by 'science', that is, by the operation of the sciences of man and society in such forms as state administration and therapy.36 Doubtless, law is integrally dependent on
science, but science depends also on law and law's coercive power for
its social operation. If science had to effect its own coercion, it would
u Bohannan, supra note 7.
38 See note 42, infra.
84 Santos, The Law of the Oppressed: The Construction and Reproduction of Legality In
Pasargada(1977), 12 Law & Soc. Rev. 5.
35 Fitzpatrick, supra note 5.
88 A formidable statement of the case can be found in Thomson, Law and Social Sciences The Demise of Legal Autonomy (paper presented at the Conference on Critical Legal Scholarship, University of Kent at Canterbury, Mar.- Apr., 1981).
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lose its essential concern for the neutrally or objectively factual. Its
political constitution would be revealed, the basis of its legitimation in
modern society would disappear and its own identity would change radically. With an audacity matching law's part in constituting the wage
labour relation, that very coercion is also a social expression of freedom. For bourgeois legality has it that such coercive interactions in the
lives of 'free' legal subjects must be justified in law. So the sphere
outside of this legal coercion is one of 'freedom', but within that sphere
come the myriads of 'normal', often more subtle, but still deeply coercive operations of science.
Accordingly, law and other social forms take identity from each
other in positively supportive ways, but the resulting convergence has
its negative aspect in its tendency towards dissolution. Hence, much of
the lamentation over 'the death of the law' sees bourgeois legality being
37
inexorably undermined by the intrusion of administration or science.
Such unidirectional scenarios do accurately perceive that law is open to
penetration by corrosive social forms. However, they are at best preemptory. Law relates to opposing social forms in ways that constitute it
positively. In this, law is separated from other social forms. It assumes
some separate and autonomous identity in positive constitutive relations
to other social forms. These are the relations of separation in their positive aspect. Law would not be what it is if related social forms were not
what they are. This argument has just been illustrated in the instances
of the prison, the wage labour relation and, summarily, that of science.
This leaves the last relational mode in our quadruple division, that
of separation in its negative aspect. In this mode, identity is asserted or
maintained in the rejection of other social forms. The most straightforward case is that of outright rejection. Law's coverage is confined by
formal jurisdictional limits and in the range of issues recognized as legally significant. Some legal systems, such as that of Imperial China,
drastically limit the range of state law and fundamentally discourage
resort to law. 3 8 For legal systems with pretensions to popular access
and broad coverage, especially those committed to a 'universal' rule of
law, oblique rather than direct rejections are necessary if law is to exclude elements threatening its identity. Most obviously, this occurs in
the vaunted problem of access to legal services and the exclusion of
many people through the differential effect of the cost of litigation, lack
37 Cf. the acute critique in Nelken, Is there a Crisis in Law and Legal Ideology? (1982), 9 J.

L. & Soc. 177.
33 Needham and Ronan, 1 The Shorter Science and Civilization in China: An Abridgement

of Joseph Needham's Original Text (1970) at 276-84, and van der Sprenkel, Legal Institutions in
Manchu China: A Sociological Analysis (1962).
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of cultural compatibility with law's processes and the allocation of inadequate resources to handle disputes.3 9
The Hunts' graphic account of the state court system in a region
of Mexico illustrates this rejection.40 More exactly, I will take one
strand of the case study, the relation between the state court and the
local Indian community. Their incompatibility may be dramatic, but it
is not atypical. The state court operates along highly formalized and
bureaucratic lines. It serves the dominant group in the region adequately. In the operation of the court, that group's local interests tend
to override the state's interests. Yet the socially subordinate Indian
community almost always dislikes taking cases to the court. This is
partly a manifest matter of Indian custom. For example, customary
marriages are not recognized in state law and cannot be dealt with in
state courts. Also, the court usually imposes fines that Indians cannot
afford or metes out inept punishments. Elopement, although deserving
only passing admonition in the Indian view, is punished in state courts
with prison sentences ranging from six months to six years and with
heavy fines. There are other more covert and illuminating rejections.
When the state court does recognize Indian claims, these will often be
distorted in ways alien to the community. An action brought against a
witch who failed to bring rain, when paid to do so, was treated as one
of fraud. In the Indian view, the resulting fine was too light. An application to the court for protection from charges of witchcraft was
treated inadequately as libel.41
Nor does the court modify its own demands to be more accommodating. If Indians tried to overcome the usual inability to pay a fine in
cash by tendering corn, they would be mocked by officials and even
imprisoned. More subtly, the very constitutive rationalities of the court
serve to repel Indian involvement. For an Indian, coming to court as a
witness is put aside if some significant agricultural task has to be carried out. It is not too speculative to say that something as basic as
different and incompatible notions of time are involved. The same incompatibility underlies the complaint of a judge who claims not to have
time to accommodate Indian modes of disputation. In peasant societies,
time fits within social relations; in capitalist societies, social relations fit
within time. Cumulatively, these rejections encourage Indians to settle
39 See generally, Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change (1974), 9 Law & Soc. Rev. 95.
40

Hunt and Hunt, "The Role of Courts in Rural Mexico," in Bock, ed., Peasants In the

Modern World (1969) 109.
41 These two examples are from another region. Indians from the region studied would not
even bring such cases because of the courts' inability to deal aptly with them, Id. at 131-32.
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disputes within their own community. Judges believe that by rejecting
Indian cases, they are eliminating Indian law. They are doing the
opposite.
Outright rejection is not the only mode of effecting separation.
There remains the paradoxical mode of rejection through acceptance.
The Hunts' case study also illustrates this. The-cases of witchcraft were
accepted by the state court, but transformed in its own terms. Also,
there are many studies shorting that when custom is penetrated by
state law, its nature changes fundamentally and it becomes part of
state law.42 The mere formal presentation of custom is incompatible
with the persistence of custom. 43 This point has profound resonances in
debates over the use of folk classifications in legal anthropology. 44 Nor
is the inability of custom to survive in an encodified world only a matter of presentation. The issue of presentation is integral to a more comprehensive division between worlds. This is aptly encapsulated in the
admonition of a magistrate of the Village Court in Papua New Guinea
to a crowd outside the courthouse. The magistrate applies 'custom'
through formal legal procedures characteristic of capitalist societies
and this contrasts with the traditional mode of dispute settlement
through popular participation. He said:
[t]his is not the good old times when every person, whether he is a party to the
dispute or not, could crowd around to hear and talk about the disputes. The
village court is a completely different institution running under a new law. We
must all respect the village court. It is only those people who are concerned that
can come to the village court to settle their disputes. Everybody else must go
45
home and involve themselves in coffee gardening, businesses and their families.

Legal procedures characteristic of capitalist societies are incompatible with the communal expression of interest and, hence, with the
41 See generally, Diamond, "The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom," in Black and
Mileski, eds., The Social Organization of Law (1973) 318 and specifically Burman, Chiefdom
Politicsand Alien Law: Basutoland under Cape Rule, 1871-1884 (1981); Chanock, Neotraditionalism and Customary Law in Malawi (1978), 16 Afr. L. Stud. 80; Le Roy, Local Law in Black
Africa: Contemporary Experiences of Folk Law Facing State Law and Capital in Senegal and
Some Other Countries (paper presented at the meeting of the Commission on Folk Law and Legal
Pluralism, Villa Servelloni, Bellagio, Sept., 1981); and Snyder, "Colonialism and Legal Form: The
Creation of 'Customary Law' in Senegal," in Sumner, ed., Crime, Justice and Underdevelopment
(1982) 90.
43 See Galanter, The Displacement of TraditionalLaw in Modern India (1968), 24 J. Soc.
Issues 65, and Twining, The Place of Customary Law in the National Legal Systems of East
Africa (1964).
44 See Bohannan, "Ethnography and Comparison in Legal Anthropology," in Nader, ed.,
Law in Culture and Society (1969) 401.
45 See Paliwala, "Law and Order in the Village: Papua New Guinea's Village Courts" in
Sumner, supra note 42, 192 at 213 for the general point and also, in the same volume, Fitzpatrick,
"The Political Economy of Dispute Settlement in Papua New Guinea" at 228.
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adequate expression of communal interests. More broadly, these are
simply instances of reification in and through law. Law transforms social issues into its own terms of communication or substantive content.46 In this way, law protects its own identity against contrary demands made on it. Also, there are other ways in which such demands
can be absorbed and their danger contained. One admits the demand
initially, but then allows it only an anaemic existence at the level of
enforcement, as in the failures of enforcement in racial discrimination
actions.4 Another mode of shaping what is allowed into the sanctum of
law and of rejecting what is not apt involves the use of broad discretionary standards, such as reasonableness and good faith. Such obfuscating forms of dispute settlement as conciliation and the judicial review of administrative action also allow a broadly similar discretion. 4 8
The implied term in contract law is another example which serves to
instance the most oblique type of rejection through acceptance. The
mechanism of the implied term imports the immediate relations of production into the contract of employment; 49 workers thereby 'agree' to
their own subjection in those relations.
In such instances, law sets and maintains an autonomy for opposing social forms, keeping them apart from itself and purporting to exercise an overall control. Yet this control is merely occasional and marginal. In such instances, the balance beti;een autonomy and control is
most often struck by law's intervention being comprehensive in terms
but limited in operation. Administrative law provides numerous examples. Again the analysis of Henry's case study showed that law's intervention in factory 'discipline' was limited operatively to procedural elements, leaving substantive elements unchanged. The balance can be
more intricate. In the same case study, the law's immediate intervention in factory 'discipline' took the form of a non-obligatory code which
was nevertheless enforced obliquely through its relevance to cases
before industrial tribunals; in this way state law came to the aid of
capital without being compromised in too intimate and too revealing an
involvement in the regime of the workplace and without manifestly undermining the integrity of that regime. In the limited nature of its involvement with other social forms, law accepts the integrity of that
46 See, e.g., Gabel, "Reification in Legal Reasoning," in Spitzer, ed., 3 Research in Law and
Sociology: A Research Annual, (1980) 25.
47 See, e.g., Marshall et al., Employment DiscriminationImpact of Legal and Administrative Remedies (1978).
48 See Arthurs, Rethinking Administrative'Law: A Slightly Dicey Business (1979), 17 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1, and, e.g., Mullard, Black Britain (1973) at 75-87.
49 See Napier, Discipline (1980).
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which it controls. Its penetration is bounded by the integrity of the opposing social form. In exceptional instances, such bounds are explicit,
even audacious. Accordingly, the maintenance of secrecy in the operation of the prison or of the capitalist enterprise has been given explicit
protection and law will rarely penetrate beyond those bounds of secrecy.50 In judicial review of administrative action, the law's restraint
in deference to the integrity of administration is on occasion open and
unqualified. 51 More often the bounds are fudged in terms of what is
"reasonable" and other such discretionary gateways. When a judge, or
another of law's gatekeepers, leaves the law at the prison gate in "the
public interest" or "implies" immediate relations of production in a
contract of employment - an operation that would rarely fit law's own
constitutive test of an "implied term ' 52 - transparencies emerge
through which the contingencies of law's identity can be glimpsed. If
identity is to be maintained, borders become places of danger and
anomaly, not to be too often explicitly confronted.5 3 Indeed, the (common) law is not "a brooding omnipresence in the sky,"" but law's operatives have to view it so because of the dangers of confronting law's
terrestrial connections. Law cannot bear very much reality. 55
V.

ACADEMIC UTILITIES

There are various academic strategies which protect law from too
much reality and serve to maintain its integrity as an object of study.
An extreme is 'legal positivism.' It asserts the self-contained nature of
law and law's moral and political neutrality. However, I will concentrate on and explore critically a cluster of academic strategies in the
field of 'law and society' to test the utility of the idea of integral plurality. These comprise the gap between law and social reality, the link
between law and consensus, and the conception of modern law as a
stage of legal development.
The gap between law and social reality is sometimes seen as the
law's lack of responsiveness .to society and sometimes in terms of its
efforts to bring society into line with it. Other approaches partially en"

See, e.g., Home Office v. Harman, [1981] 2 All E. R. 349, and Nasse v. Science Research

Council, [1979] 3 W.L.R. 762.
51 See, e.g., Local Government Board v. Arlidge, [1915] A.C. 120.
82 Cf Napier, supra note 49, at 5 and 12.
53 Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (1970).
54 Holmes as quoted in Megarry, Miscellany-at-Law: A Diversionfor Lawyers and Others
(1955) at 268.

13 Cf Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral (1935) at 49.
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compass both these, such as the gap between law in books and law in
action or between what law says and what it does.58 For all these approaches, the gap is a bridgeable one. At least, it is held to be so in an
unspecified range of relations between law and society. Alternatively,
none of these approaches envisages the unbridgeability of the gap in
any specific instance. On the contrary, their impetus is a concern to
bridge the gap through changing the content or operation of law. 7 No
specific challenge to law's integrity is admitted. Law is thus preserved
as a unitary object of study immune to the challenges of the plurality
of its constitutive social forms. Not being restrained in any specific relation with other social forms, law has an unspecific potential efficacy.
This is nothing more than the academic analogue of bourgeois legality.
With bourgeois legality, law must appear comprehensively capable of
rule or, at least, not be seen to be specifically incapable. There is no
need to labour the differences between these approaches and that of
integral plurality. For integral plurality, law is constituted in relations
of opposition and support with other social forms to the effect that
there are necessarily unbridgeable gaps between law and other social
forms. Perceptions of a gap are accurate to the extent that they accommodate social forms opposed to law. But the gap cannot be bridged, for
law depends on these opposed social forms. It depends integrally on
what is contrary to it. The gap is set. There is not in the gap some
vague, but remediable derogation from the efficacy of law; rather, there
is something constitutive of law itself.
"Consensus" is one way of bridging the gap. "It is possible," Talleyrand said, "to do many things with a bayonet, but one cannot sit on
one."'58 So with law, it cannot coerce comprehensively and must depend, so it is said, on consensus. In a valuable and wide-ranging survey,
Hunt finds a unity between "contemporary Marxist and non-Marxist
theories of law" in a shared and fundamental concern with "the dichotomy between coercion and consent" in the constitution of law. In this,
there is a particular concern with consent. 59 The immediate problem in
dealing with consent is to give it some content. In "dichotomy between
coercion and consent," consent emerges from the framing of the prob56 For illustrations of some of these approaches and an analysis broadly similar to that offered here see Fitzpatrick, "Law, Modernization and Mystification" in Spitzer, supra note 46, at
161.

See, for an analysis of some instances, Gurvitch, Sociology of Law (1947) at 122-35.
As quoted in Nwafor, History and the Intelligence of the Disinherited(1975), 7 The Rev.
of Radical Political Econ. 43.

" Hunt, Dichotomy and Contradictionin the Sociology of Law (1981), 8 Brit. J.L. & Soc'y
47 at 47, 62 and 73.
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lematic. Coercion is not sufficient to secure compliance with law.
Therefore, there must be consent as well. Consent acquires identity and
coherence in binary opposition to coercion. For the non-Marxist theories of law, this leaves consent conveniently vague. Any compliant behaviour not coerced through law becomes consent. Hence, the operative
or factual validity of bourgeois legality is given in the constitution of
the problematic. To adopt Foucault's argument, power is presented
through law as a negative constraint, leaving a measure of freedom intact. In this way, the coercive operation of other social forms is masked
and the exercise of a coercive, disciplinary power outside of law is rendered acceptable. 60
Marxist theories of law fare little better. They seem to rely on a
similar constitutive dynamic in the formation of 'consent'. The emphasis on consent, as Fryer et aL indicate, emerges in reaction against a socalled "rather naive and instrumental version of Marxism, which
treated law exclusively as a coercive apparatus wielded at will by a
malevolent ruling class." 1 The emphasis on coercion cannot account,
as Gramsci has argued, for "the 'spontaneous' consent given by the
great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group. 6 2 With the Marxist variant, consent seems to merge into the oblique or elusive coercions of
some Gramscian notion of "hegemony", but 'consent' still means a significant consent and it is still set against coercion.63 Under such a view
then, law must be seen, as constituted, in significant part through general consent. This general consent maintains law as autonomous or 'relatively autonomous' both as an object of study and as a field of political
action. 6 ' Law cannot be reduced to dominant class and economic elements. Thus, the integrity and unitary nature of 'law' is maintained.
60 Foucault, Power/Knowledge:Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (1980) at
104; Foucault, The History of Sexuality, An Introduction, No. 1 (1981) at 86, 144.
61 Fryer et al., "Law, State and Society," in Fryer et al., eds., Law, State and Society (1981)
9 at 11.
62 As quoted in Hunt, supra note 59, at 62.

63 Cf. Althusser's neo-Gramscian notion of Ideological State Apparatuses which comprise
such as educational and religious institutions and the family and operate basically as "ideology".
These are contrasted with a "Repressive State Apparatus" (emphasis added). Law functions in
both the "ideological" and the "repressive" spheres. See, Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and
Other Essays (1971) at 124-49.
14 Hunt, supra note 59, at 62-65 and 67-72. General consent is not necessarily the sole support for such autonomy. Engels, among others, would add there is a need for modern law to be

"an internally coherent expression"; letter to Conrad Schmidt, as quoted (with the emphasis) in
Cain and Hunt, Marx and Engels on Law (1979) at 57. It is not infrequently also said that some
'relative autonomy' of the state and of law is needed because of the limited rule of the bourgeoisie;
see, e.g., Poulantzas, PoliticalPower and Social Classes (1973) at 284-85; this is congruent with
a need for some general consent. Compare, infra note 78.
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In the perspective of integral plurality, consenting persons are normalized through a diversity of coercions operating in a constellation of
social forms, usually constituted and maintained by law, and in the
general standards cited in these forms. Such social forms include the
prison, the workplace, the family, various therapeutic regimes, monitorial schooling and state welfare regimes. The effect is that consent is
pre-shaped to conform to extant structures of domination.6 5 It is not a
matter of people being influenced by other social forms and then adopting an attitude of consent towards law, either specifically or as a diffused part of "the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group.' 6' 6 Rather, it is a more contemporaneous and
more intimate matter. Consenting persons are constituted in and by
these social forms, which interact concurrently with-in law and so operate to constitute law. In short, the inter-relations between law, consent
and coercion are closer and more complex than the simple dichotomy
between coercion and consent can even remotely allow. These same inter-relations undermine the efficacy of solitary consent as a basis for
the autonomy and integrity of law.
The analysis of the conception of modern law as a 'stage' in legal
development can be stated with the words of Karl Marx:
The so-called historical presentation of development is founded, as a rule, on the
fact that the latest form regards the previous ones as steps leading up to itself,

and, since it is rarely and only under quite specific conditions able to criticize
itself - leaving aside, of course, the historical periods which appear to themselves as times of decadence - it always conceives them one-sidedly. The Christian religion was able to be of assistance in reaching an objective understanding
of earlier mythologies only when its over self-criticism had been accomplished to
a certain degree. . . Likewise, bourgeois economics arrived at an understanding
of feudal, ancient, oriental economics only after the self-criticism of bourgeois
society had begun. In so far as the bourgeois economy did not mythologically
identify itself altogether with the past, its critique of the previous economies,
notably of feudalism, with which it was still engaged in direct struggle, resembled the critique which Christianity levelled against paganism, or also that of
"5 The argument is developed further in Fitzpatrick, supra note 5. There are other relevant
aspects which deserve some mention but are not immediately relevant to "the dichotomy between
coercion and consent." Generally, the positing of a vague, unitary 'consent' has a flattening effect
in analytical and political terms. That is, such 'consent' obscures a significant diversity of behaviour. In an illuminating analysis of the limits of the notions of consensus, legitimacy and the like,
Rootes draws attention to a large "dissensus. . . even in those states that are apparently politically stable": Rootes, Intellectuals, the Intelligentsia and the Problem of Legitimacy, (paper
presented to the Workshop on "The Politics of Intellectuals, the Intelligentsia and Educated Labour," European Consortium for Political Research, Joint Session, Freiburg-im-Breisgau, Mar.,
1983, at 1 (his emphasis)). And he proceeds to consider how compliance is secured short of active
consent. For example, "Subordination to authority at work does . . . have consequences for the

way working people think: it promotes the

. . .

inability to conceptualize either the structural

sources of their troubles or the alternatives to them." Id. at 4.
e See, supra note 62, and the accompanying text.
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Protestantism against Catholicism.6

The modern age is not unique in its self-conception as both the
culmination and rejection of all that has preceded it. Modern law is at
one with the age. Its culmination is as a universalist, unitary and statecentred form. In this, law is seen as evolving from, yet set against, a
plurality of particularist social forms. Its integrity as a distinct stage of
legal development is achieved, in part, in the ostensible rejection of
such social forms. It is possible to provide an initial indicative sketch of
the emergence of modern law in its relation to this plurality. I will use
the sketch to account for the stage of modern law as a unitary, statecentred conception and introduce alternative conceptions of law responsive to the idea of integral plurality.
The sketch of the emergence of modern law is presented around
the three merging lines of the economic, the political and the line of
mentalities. It has been said that modern law emerges in the triumph
of the bourgeoisie. Law, developing closely with the constitution of individual property, becomes and takes identity as an instrument in the
historically necessary universalism of the rule of the bourgeoisie.68 It
becomes so as a distinct form of law and not as operatively integrated
with other social forms.6 9 As such, law is not only a social presentation
set against lesser, particularist orders, but is used in their elimination
and in the constitution of an alternative site of power.70 Giddens pithily
adds the wider perspective and points towards deeper dimensions:
The vast extension of time-space mediations made structurally possible by the

prevalence of money capital, by the commodification of labour and by the transformability of the one into the other, undercuts the segregated and autonomous
character of the local community of producers. Unlike the situation in most contexts in [pre-capitalist] class-divided societies, in capitalism class struggle is built
into the very constitution of work and the labour setting.7 1

Jakubowski finds that the "dissolution of traditional entities such
as the corporations and estates places individuals alongside each other
as independent, private persons whose special links take mainly legal
forms"7 2 and the constitution of the "individual" as legal subject are, in
67

Marx, Grundrisse:Foundations of the Critique of PoliticalEconomy (1973) at 106.

" See Unger, Law in Modern Society: Toward a Criticism of Social Theory (1976) and, cf.,
Poulantzas, supra note 64, at 284-85.
69 See Arthur, "Editor's Introduction," in Pashukanis, supra note 17, at 14, 16.
70 See, e.g., Horwitz, The Transformationof American Law, 1780-1860 (1977) at 253 and
Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origins of the Black Act (1977).
71 Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (1981) at 121.
72 Jakubowski, Ideology and Superstructure in Historical Materialism, translated by A.
Booth (1976) at 95.
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turn, integrally tied to "commodification. 1 3 Law encompasses and mediates between the individual and the general relations made possible
by "the prevalence of money capital, by the commodification of labour
and by the transformability of the one into the other. '7 4 Law is implicated in that basic contradiction in the constitution of modern society
so vividly described by Marx:
Only in the eighteenth century, in 'civil society', do the various forms of social
connectedness confront the individual as a mere means towards his private purposes, as external necessity. But the epoch which produces this standpoint, that
of the isolated individual, is also precisely that of the hitherto most developed
social (from this standpoint, general) relations. 75

Other heralds of modern society have, of course, discerned a similar
division and have seen law as of particular significance in this. For
Durkheim, progress towards "organic solidarity" entails increasing collaboration between individuals through law which, in turn requires increasing "administration" by the state as the operative representation
of general social relations.7 This utter centrality of law is revealed in a
Marxist perspective for it is one that squarely confronts class division.
Class division cuts across the idylls of "organic solidarity" or "civil society," and the like positing of an harmonious integration, through law
or otherwise, of the individual and general social relations. No longer is
class division contained in "the segregated and autonomous character
of the local community of producers" but "is built into the very constitution of the 'work and labour setting'." 7 This setting is founded on
coercion and inequality. Further, there results from this change in the
effectivity of class division a potential for the working class to act at
the level of general social relations. The combination of this potentiality
and this subordination in relations of coercion and inequality is ominous for the dominant class. It is in the prospect of class division that
modern law, as bourgeois legality, comes into its own in effecting the
'voluntary' and 'equal' adherence of the legal subject to certain coercive
and unequal relations of production and in guaranteeing equal and universal rule outside of those relations, countering, in both instances, the
effects of class subordination. In this, law cannot be reduced to a strategic position adopted by the bourgeoisie for it is also something won
by the working class.78 As well as operating directly or in its own right,
73 Pashukanis, supra note 17.
7' Giddens, supra note 71, at 121.
75 Marx, supra note 67, at 84.

7,See Gurvitch, supra note 57, at 86. Compare, id. at 87.
77 Giddens, supra note 71, at 121.
" See, e.g., Weitzer, Law and Legal Ideology: Contributionsto the Genesis and Reproduc-

1984]

Law and Societies

modern law has further significance in mutual inter-connections with
the state. It is the state which is the prime mediator between the individual and general social relations and which compensates most comprehensively for the effects of class division or which otherwise acts to
contain it.7 As part of and apart from the state, law is a symbolic and
an operative embodiment and guarantor of the equality and universality of state rule and a factor of cohesion in state activity.
In short, a distinct, certain and bounded identity for law is at the
core of the making and the maintenance of modern society. Law is an
encompassing of the individual and general social relations formalized
in universal and equal rule. As such, it is integrally set against social
relations of a lesser scale or of a particularistic nature. This opposition
was manifested in struggles against agrarian use rights, customs and
notions of property antithetical to the advance of the bourgeoisie. However, once so cast, law's identity in opposition could and did extend to
comparable social forms whether continuing in spite of law and modernity or appearing as new or as qualitatively different. The family, the
penitentiary and various welfare regimes could be taken as instances.
For the maintenance of law's identity, these social forms had to be
subordinate to law and this subordination is effected in law's constitution and control of such social forms. In the process these social forms
are endowed with a supportive aura of universal right.
In terms of mentalities and the supportive complicities of scholarship, law becomes associated with what is effective, that which acts and
controls, rather than that which is acted on and controlled. It dominates rather than reflects nature. It partakes of the rationally constructivist rather than the organic, of the universalist rather than the particularist, of the determinant rather than the contingent, of effective
change rather than residual continuity. Once its new stage was secure,
law could draw on traditions and arrogate some legitimation in continuity. The fusion of the innovative and stasis was achieved in notions
of evolution:
[I]n the second half of the nineteenth century. . . it is no longer the analysis of
the legal form, but, the problem of justifying the binding force of legal regulation
which becomes the focal point of interest for juridical theory. The result is a
strange mixture of historicism and juridical positivism which is reduced to negat-

lion of Capitalism (1980), 25 Berkeley J. Soc. 137 at 146-47. It may be revealing to consider a
dynamic "reciprocity" between classes here, instead of a static consensus: see Sugarman, "Theory
and Practice in Law and History: A Prologue to the Study of the Relationship between Law and
Economy from a Socio-historical Perspective," in Fryer et al., supra note 61, at 92-94.
79 This again (cf. ,supra note 10) could be seen as Hegel scaled down: see, Wellmer, Critical
Theory of Society (1971) at 76-77.
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ing every law except the official law.80

It was in the latter half of the nineteenth century that law's "own selfcriticism had been accomplished to a certain degree."' , This was accompanied by an informed critique and, in part, an adoption of earlier

legal forms.8 2 Notions of evolution provided some resolution of contra-

dictions between critique and adoption. In terms of the origins of the
scholarship of 'law and society,' it is notions of evolution and quasiHegelian equivalents that set the seal on the modern idea of law. As
Gurvitch shows in his seminal account of the "forerunners and founders" of the sociology of law, contemporary scholarship tied law to the
state in a culmination of legal development that displaced or incorporated prior forms of law and custom. This outcome is extended, at least
implicitly, to favour generally the claims of the "inclusive" society over
all "included" social forms.83 In this, the state-centered, formalistic
"prejudices of the dogmatic jurists" are upheld.8
To pursue an instance into the twentieth century, this sketch of
origins may prompt questioning of the central interest of sociological
jurisprudence with the effectiveness of law. The summary response is
that this concern is an expression of class interests. The bluntness of
the answer can be mitigated, but is not qualified, in placing those class
interests and their relation to law at the heart of the constitution of
modem capitalist society. The resulting 'law', in a unitary and statecentred conception, continues to set the very bounds for legal scholarship. It elevates certain lines of enquiry and subordinates or excludes
others. Sociological jurisprudence and legal realism are certainly concerned with the limiting and undermining effect that other social forms
have on law.85 But the presentation of this concern is precisely limited.
Law, as 'law in books,' may be seen as subordinate to interests reflected
in law or to what officials actually do about disputes. The focus of the
concern remains formal legal process and formal legal doctrine - the
11Pashukanis, supra note

17, at 69.
See note 67 supra,and the accompanying passage. An example of "self-criticism. .. , to a
certain degree" would be von Ihering's influential account of law in terms of "interest": see generally Stone, Social Dimensions of Law and Justice (1966) at 164-98. The self-criticism is preceded
and accompanied by law's self-realization to a certain degree, as exemplified in the work of
Austin.
" See, e.g., id. at 86-118.
8

" Gurvitch, supra note 57, at 72-96. Important as Gurvitch's work is, it leaves large gaps
which would have to be made good in a less abbreviated account than that offered here. The
difficult case of Marx is not considered. Weber is too summarily dismissed: Id. at 30. And the
central significance of Maine is not adequately confronted: cf., id. at 74-75.
The phrase comes from id. at 77.
" See, generally, Hunt, The Sociological Movement in Law (1978).
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"prejudices of the dogmatic jurists." The range of social forms considered relevant is set from within a pre-constituted 'law'. Academic legal
knowledge is generated by applying a certain idea of law to the world.
This approach cannot extend to social forms which do not find expression in terms of legal process or doctrine. The integrity of 'law' is thus
obliquely but potently affirmed in areas of scholarship that claim to be
fundamentally sceptical of it.
In crude summary, modern law can be seen as a distinct stage of
development only because of the conditions of its emergence. These entailed a specific dynamic of identity and a specific constitutive connection between 'law and society.' This specific connection and the resulting distinctness of law cannot be a general basis for a theory of stages
or types of law. Yet it is implicitly so used when different stages or
types of a reified 'law' are seen to result from different stages or types
of 'society'. As Nelken so aptly puts a contrary suggestion, "as we
move to an increasingly 'managed' society," it does not follow "that
law must necessarily follow suit and be shaped accordingly." 86 Against
the more familiar argument, it can be said that the apparent increase
in state administration may not promote "bureaucratic-administrative
law" at the expense of bourgeois legality. It may lead to an increased
reliance on bourgeois legality. In the perspective of integral plurality,
there is a range of 'legal' types in society - "a kind of regulatory continuum"88 - and a persisting interaction between them. Hence Galanter's
challenging argument that:
[o] nee we put aside the notion that law is typically public, unified and direct in
its operations, we can formulate the question of the change of the role of law in
modem society as a question of changing relations between the big (public, national, official) legal system and the lesser normative orderings in society.8 '

Galanter offers an illustration of one such "change of the role of
law in modern society." He adopts familiar assertions that there is currently an increasing social ordering through "technocratic controls and
communal arrangements." 90 In the perception of this increase, conventional views predict the demise of bourgeois legality. On the contrary,
Galanter finds an increasing resort to bourgeois legality "to monitor
and oversee" these "alternative" modes of ordering and to effect their
86Supra note 37, at 184.
67

Cf.Kamenka and Tay, "Beyond Bourgeois Individualism: the Contemporary Crisis in Law

and Legal Ideology," in Kamenka and Neale, eds., Feudalism, Capitalism and Beyond (1975)
126.
asCotterrell, The Sociological Concept of Law (in press), J. L. & Sod'y.
81 Galanter, supra note 4, at 20.
90 Id. at 21.
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"articulation . . . to other social ordering."9 1 However, the conventional view does not miss the point entirely. The increasing differentiation and independence of alternative modes of ordering intensify law's
difficulties in controlling these other modes; control through law is increasingly ineffective and consigned to the symbolical. 2 A congruent
example will help broaden the analysis. Stewart's account of "the reformation of American administrative law" deals, in part, with law's response to the increase in and the intractability of administrative discretion, in the face of which:
[C]ourts have changed the focus in judicial review (in the process expanding and
transforming traditional procedural devices) so that its dominant purpose is no
longer the prevention of unauthorized intrusions on private autonomy, but the
assurance of fair representation for all affected interests. . .. 03

This example shows law responding to the claims of another social
form by limiting precisely, but not denying, its own power of intervention. This suggests that there is a diversity and a complexity in the
relation between law and other social forms lying between a comprehensive control by law of these forms and a retreatist symbolism in the
face of their advance. This diversity and complexity have already been
explored in the earlier account of modes of relation between law and
other social forms. The relation between law and another social form
involved a necessary separation between them. If the integrity of the
other social form was to be maintained, law could not control it comprehensively. Law would be left with a certain want of power which its
own pretentions to comprehensive rule would not allow it to recognize.
It is from this fissure in the effective identity of law that a certain symbolism emerges.
Even if, as Galanter says, law is increasingly symbolical, it cannot,
in terms of his analysis, be so merely because it takes on a direct effectiveness in the cause of ordering through administration and community. If law's effectiveness in this changed, such ordering would also
change. To provide a full explanation, it is necessary to return to the
constitutive, but contradictory relations of support and opposition between law and other social forms. Within these relations, the fixity of
such categories as 'administration' and 'community' as outright challenges to the integrity of law cannot stand. The apparent resort to community ordering has been validly seen, not so much as a challenge to
91 Id.
2

Id. at 19.

Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law (1975), 88 Harv. L. Rev.
1669 at 1712.
93
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state law but as a mode of its extensionY' More common, of course, is
the assumption that the inexorable advance of state administration is
the expense of law. 5 There is much about law that these premature
scenarios overlook, but, most immediate to the present analysis, they
fail to confront the integral dependence of administration on lawY8
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no better way to expose the limits of an enquiry than to
try to bring it to a close. In my presentation, I have taken a part of the
Hegelian notion of dialectical contradiction and transmogrified it in application to a particular social sphere.9 This contrasts with positing a
social form and then seeing its connection to the world as a matter of
'external' relations. Rather, "this positedness is in itself."98 A social
form takes identity "in itself," yet relationally by being in opposition to
the social forms that support it. Accordingly, law establishes identity in
conterminous relations of opposition and support with a plurality of
other social forms. This integral plurality entails a convergence, yet necessitates separation between law and these other social forms. This
method of enquiry does not match the ostensible confidence of that
agenda. A specific, operative idea of modern law, that of bourgeois legality, was taken as a starting point. It was found to exist in certain
relations of opposition and support with other social forms. From these
relations, certain modes of convergence and separation between law
and other social forms were identified and explored. The utility of the
analysis was tested through an extended application to persistent academic issues about the nature of law and its relation to society.
This was to be an open and an opening enquiry. The exploration of
the connections between law and specific social forms cannot claim to
'

See Abel, ed., The Politics of Informal Justice, The American Experience, No. 1 (1982).

" This characterizes even such penetrating accounts as Donzelot, The Policingof Families:
Welfare versus the State (1980) at 116 and Foucault, Power/Knowledge, supra note 60, at 107-

108.
" A similar dependence is elaborated on in Fitzpatrick, supra note 5. Habermas provides an
analysis relevant here, one sensitive to the identity and limits of social forms, including administration; he finds a particular need in present-day society to maintain separate from administration
"expressive symbols" involved in, amongst other things, "the symbolic use of hearings" and "juridical incantations": Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (1976) at 69-70, et passim. This particular

need is based on the perceived politicization of the relations of production within societies of advanced captialism, a perception that I have implicitly viewed as overdrawn in the earlier analysis
of the capitalist labour relation.
"The difficulties skirted around in this abrupt process are considerable. For an exploration
of this, and for literature by and about Hegel that is unusually lucid see Norman and Sayers,
Hegel, Marx and Dialectic" A Debate (1980).
" Hegel, Hegel's Science of Logic (1969) at 488 - emphasis in the original.
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be more than illustrative. No comprehensive claims could be made
about law's constitutive relations with other social forms. Similarly, no
settled alternative view of law could be offered, nor the identification of
some'stage or tendency in the development of law. Instead, the concern
was to employ and to establish in use the idea of integral plurality in
the 'deconstruction' of such conceptions and of related academic complicities. As Marx said, the dialectic "lets nothing impose upon it."' '
Nonetheless, I have asserted, the central significance of modern law's
relation to particular social forms, especially the capitalist labour relation. 10° Linked with the idea of integral plurality, this assertion serves
to identify limits on the necessarily universalistic pretentions of bourgeois legality and serves to explain the hold and the obduracy of abstracted, unitary conceptions of law. Not that the analysis has been set
against abstraction. It has been set against an abstraction that forgets
too much of its beginnings, and loses too much on the voyage out. I
have been concerned to show that the selection necessitated by abstraction, the inclusion of some things and the exclusion of others, is itself
an arrogation of power. In contrast to the comforts of premature abstraction, I have tried to stress that law is the unsettled product of relations with a plurality of social forms. As such, law's identity is constantly and inherently subject to challenge and change. Our enquiries
into law have to be more diverse and more wide-ranging. Although
they may seem perpetually open-ended, such inquiries should, dialectically speaking, reveal unifying and cohering elements as well.

Marx, Capital, No.1 (Afterword to the Second German Edition, 1954) at 29.
Modem law's relation with science was also said to be central but it was touched on only
briefly. For a fuller development, see Fitzpatrick, supra note 5.
'
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